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I. INTRODUCTION
In the arid West, population concentrations often are
located in areas with limited surface water supplies. It has
long been the practice to supplement local supplies by bringing
in water from other locations. In many cases, these transfers
involve moving water substantial distances--often between
separate drainages and even between separate river basins. The
receiving area benefits from the additional water that becomes
available. However, concerns about the loss of this water to the
area from which it is taken (the area of origin) have led many
western states to enact some form of statutory protection or
1 imitation.1
This report considers the approaches that have been taken to
accommodate the interests of the area of origin. It begins with
a brief discussion of the general legal context established by
the prior appropriation doctrine. It turns next to a consider
ation of the conceptual basis underlying area of origin protect
ion. Then it discusses the types of protection that exist in the
law, with special attention to the approach found in Colorado.
Then it offers an economic framework within which to evaluate
earlier discussions, see National Water Commission,
Water Policies for the Future, 323-324 (1973) [hereinafter
National Water Commission Report]; R. Kletzing & R. Robie, Area
of Origin Statutes--The California Experience, 15 Idaho
L. Rev. 419 (1979). G. Weatherford, Legal Aspects of Inter
regional Water Diversion, 15 UCLA L. Rev. 1299, 1313-1317
(1968); R. Johnson, National Water Commission, Major Interbasin
Transfers--Legal Aspects (Legal Study No. 7, National Water
Commission) 67-86 (preliminary draft July 26, 1971) [hereinafter
Legal Study No. 7].
such legal approaches.
II. GENERAL LEGAL CONTEXT—PRIOR APPROPRIATION SYSTEM
The prior appropriation system, prevalent in the western
United States, evolved from the customs of the mid-nineteenth
century mining communities, and subsequently was adopted by
courts and legislatures. The appropriation doctrine operates on
the principle of "first in time, first in right." In contrast
with the riparian system of water allocation found in the rela
tively humid East, the appropriation doctrine involves no
watershed or land-ownership limitations on the use of the water.
As was established in the early Colorado case of Coffin v. Left
Hand Ditch Company,2 water can be removed from the stream and
diverted from the watershed of origin for use elsewhere, even
though none of that water returns to the original stream system.
Out-of-watershed transfers are thus recognized as proper, so long
as the water is put to a beneficial use. Future uses are not
protected—application to a beneficial use is the central feature
of a final appropriative right. Because an existing beneficial
use is crucial to the obtaining of a priority, those who have no
beneficial use requirement at the present time are necessarily
placed in a position of lower priority compared with those who
have made an actual appropriation.
Given this basic principle, it is clear that protection of
an exporting area, county, or watershed is not characteristic of
26 Colo. 443 (1882).
the appropriation system. Any efforts to protect areas of origin
are therefore in derogation of underlying appropriation prin
ciples.
III. THE AREA OF ORIGIN CONCEPT
In spite of the fundamental policy embodied in the appropri
ation doctrine favoring movement of scarce water resources to
beneficially usable locations, many states following this
doctrine have enacted some form of statutory restrictions or
limitations on interbasin transfers. Searching for an explana
tion for such statutory provisions, the National Water Commission
report pointed to inadequacies in the market for allocating
water.3 The Commission commented that areas of origin for
natural resources other than water do not receive such treatment,
3in its final report, the Commission stated:
Area-of-origin protection is peculiarly
associated with water. Other resources are
not similarly treated, probably because they
are priced in conventional markets. For
coal, oil, copper, timber, and other natural
resources, the area of origin receives its
"protection" in the form of taxes and
revenues from the "export" of the resource.
In the absence of a pricing system for the
export of water, area-of-origin interests
have resorted to the political process to
obtain "in kind" protection, that is,
enactment of laws reserving water for the
area's "ultimate requirements" or providing
for recapture in the event of future need.
As a consequence of this approach, safeguards
for a water exporting area have usually been
tied to future or potential water development
in the area.
National Water Commission Report, supra note 1 at 323.
although severance taxes are in fact based on the notion of
allocating a share of the wealth distributed by nature in the
form of mineral deposits or timber stands to those who happen to
live in the adjoining area.4 it is true that water may be
appropriated without payment of a market-established price but
the same is true for hard rock minerals on the public lands.
An often-cited illustration of the need for area-of-origin
protection for water resources is the Owens Valley in
California.5 to supply its burgeoning water requirements in the
early part of this century, the City of Los Angeles bought up
much of the agricultural land and accompanying water rights in
the Owens Valley east of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. A major
aqueduct was constructed to transport this water to Los Angeles.
The effect was to virtually eliminate what had been a thriving
agricultural economy. Though Los Angeles paid for the water
rights and much of the agricultural land, it did not have to
provide any compensation for the other costs associated with the
loss of this economy.
In Colorado, a recent presentation by a West Slope county
commissioner reflects many of the concerns that charge this
issue:
^Another interesting parallel can be found in the statutes
passed in the 1970fs to provide special protection to local areas
impacted by the rapid growth accompanying energy and mineral
development. See, e.g. MacDonnell, "Regulating Socioeconomic
Impacts: Comparing the Colorado and Wyoming Approaches," 20 Land
& Water L. Rev. 193 (1985).
5A full account is provided in R. Nadeau, The Water Seekers
(1950) and E. Cooper, Aqueduct Empire (1968).
The fact of the matter is, that when water is
diverted to the Eastern Slope, it is lost
forever to Western Colorado counties.
Without some form of substantial mitigation,
the only consequences are negative ones from
the Western Slope perspective.
But when water goes down the Western
Slope—even if it's [sic] ultimate destina
tion is California—the benefits, both
present and potential, are considerable
indeed: esthetically, there are the simple
pleasures of babbling brook [sic]; recrea-
tionally, the water support [sic] fisheries,
wildlife, vegetation, boating, camping,
snowmaking, and other activities. Growth-
wise, so long as there is water in the
streambed, the possibility exists for future
storage—whether for municipal, industrial,
recreational, or energy use. All things
appear possible to Western Coloradoans while
water remains in the streambed, but when it
is removed across the peaks, the options
dwindle rapidly.6
Perspectives on area of origin protection can shift rapidly
depending on the area being considered. In Colorado, some of
those who oppose area of origin protection for the West Slope are
strongly in favor of protecting Colorado's share of Colorado
River water as against lower basin states. What is an area of
origin, and, under what circumstances should such areas receive
special consideration when transbasin diversions of waters
from such areas are undertaken? As we will discuss below, the
approaches that have been taken vary enormously—perhaps reflect
ing the wide variation in political interests within these
states.
We believe that there are legitimate interests that should
6David Mott, "The West Side Story," Presentation at 10th
Annual Water Workshop, Gunnison, Colorado, Aug. 1, 1985.
be accounted for in interbasin transfers which are not suffi
ciently recognized under the traditional appropriation doctrine.
In a very real sense there is no such thing as "surplus" water.7
A watershed is permanently changed when its natural flow is
diverted and removed. The full costs associated with this change
must be accounted for and included in the cost of the diversion.
In the absence of a market that gives the appropriate price
signals, statutorily created mechanisms are needed. We turn next
to a review of the various approaches that have been taken.
IV. TYPES OF PROTECTION
Area of origin protection methods can be divided into three
general categories: prohibition or severe restriction; alloca
tion; and compensation. It is important to note that the
approaches taken often involve some mixture of methods from among
these categories.
A. Prohibition or Severe Restriction
The most extreme form of protection is, of course, to
prohibit such transfers. Examples may be found in most jurisdic
tions following the riparian doctrine and in the former law of
Nebraska. Examples of major restrictions are provided under the
current law in Arizona and Montana.
1. Riparian Law. Riparian water law itself has a built-in
?Nevertheless, see the Oklahoma definition cited in text
accompanying note 30 infra.
protection for the watershed, inasmuch as use of water is
generally limited to (a) riparian land, by which is meant land
alongside the watercourse, and (b) use in the watershed of
origin.8 Furthermore, in contrast to the appropriation doctrine,
riparian law does not require water to be put to a beneficial use
in order to establish the water right. In general, the riparian
maintains an inchoate right to enjoy the benefits of water
flowing past his land. Thus if a city such as New York desires
to obtain nonriparian water it must utilize its power of eminent
domain and pay for the property value taken.9
2. The Nebraska Experience. In 1889 the Nebraska legisla
ture enacted the following provision: "The water appropriated
from a river or stream shall not be turned or permitted to run
into the waters or channnel of any other river or stream than
that from which it is taken or appropriated."10 An amendment in
1893 added: "Unless such stream exceeds in width one hundred
feet, in which event not more than seventy-five percent of the
regular flow shall be taken."11 In 1895 the Nebraska legislature
enacted some major changes in its water law which included the
following provision:
8C. Davis, H. Coblentz, 0. Titelbaum, Waters & Water Rights
§614.1 (E. Clark ed. 1976).
^In the case of New York City, there is an additional
statutory requirement which is discussed below under compensa
tion. See text accompanying note 48 infra.
10Neb. Laws 1889, Ch. 68, §6, at 504.
lxNeb. Laws 1893, Ch. 40, §3, at 378. (Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-
206 (1984)).
The owner or owners of any irrigation
ditch or canal shall carefully maintain the
embankments thereof so as to prevent waste
therefrom, and shall return the unused water
from such ditch or canal with as little waste
thereof as possible to the stream from which
such water was taken or to the Missouri
River.12
In the case of Osterman v. Central Neb. Public Power
v. Irr. Dist.13 the Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted these
statutes as effectively barring all transbasin diversions. A
subsequent court decision overruled Ostermanl^, and in 1981, the
Nebraska legislature passed new legislation permitting interbasin
transfers that pass a public interest review.15
3. Arizona. Under Arizona law, out-of-watershed transfers
are severely restricted because irrigation districts, agricultur
al improvement districts, or water users associations located
within and using water from the drainage are given a veto right
regarding all water transfers.16 The provision states:
No right to the use of water on or from
any watershed or drainage area which supplies
or contributes water for the irrigation of
lands within an irrigation district, agricul
tural improvement district or water users
association shall be severed or transferred
without the consent of the governing body of
121895 Neb. Laws ch. 69, §46-265 (1984).
i3131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936).
l^ Blue Natural Resource District v. Lower Platte
North Natural District, 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980).
15Neb. Laws 1981, LB 252, §6, Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-289
(1984). This statute is discussed infra in text accompanying
note 36.
i6Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §45-172(5).
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such irrigation district, agricultural
improvement district or water users associa
tion. 17
Though directed at transfers generally and not just out of
watershed diversions, the restrictive effect is apparent. There
are no reported Arizona cases involving this law.
4. Montana. In the 1985 legislative session, Montana
enacted some major changes in its water laws. Of relevance here
is a provision that enables only the Montana Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation to engage in out-of-basin
transfers.18 Presumably, those desiring such out-of-basin
transfers must first convince the state to make the necessary
appropriations, then obtain a lease from the state to use the
water, and then build the facilities necessary to move the
water.1^ A separate provision establishes a means for reserving
waters "for existing or future beneficial uses or to maintain a
minimum flow, level, or quality of water...."20
B. Allocation
Perhaps the most common method of providing protection is
through provisions that directly or indirectly allocate some
17 id.
18HB68O, §3 (1985), to be codified at Mont. Code Ann. §85-2-
301(2) (i). The basins are specifically named in the law and
include all the major Montana river systems.
more than 50,000 acre-feet may be leased. Lease terms
may not exceed 50 years. HB680, §13 (1985).
20HB680, §15 (1985) .
portion of the water to be available for future use in the area
of origin. The approaches taken here include recapture, reserva
tion, and evaluation,
1. Recapture or Permanent Priority. California statutes
enacted in 1931 and 1933 attempt to provide protection to the
area of origin by making certain state-held water rights subject
to future requirements of these areas.21 The 1931 Act has been
characterized as providing a "right of recapture against the
users of export water, conditioning all export water rights by
giving users in the county of origin a right to recapture
exported water any time the water becomes necessary for the
development of the county."22 »phe 1933 Act, which relates
specifically to the Central Valley Project, also creates an
inchoate priority to obtain water whenever needed by inhabitants
of the area of origin that would supercede the priorities of
21The 1931 provision states: "No priority under this part
shall be released nor assignment made of any application that
will... deprive the county in which the water covered by the
application originates of any such water necessary for the
development of the county." Ch. 720, §1 [1931] Cal. Stat. 1514,
codified in Cal. Water Code §10505 (West, 1971 & Supp. 1985).
The 1933 statute states: "In the construction and operation by
the department of any project under the provisions of this part a
watershed or area wherein water originates, or an area immediate
ly adjacent thereto which can conveniently be supplied with water
therefrom, shall not be deprived by the department directly or
indirectly of the prior right to all of the water reasonably
required to adequately supply the beneficial needs of the
watershed, area, or any of the inhabitants or property owners
therein." Ch. 1042, §11 [1933] Cal. Stat. 2643, codified in
Cal. Water Code §11460 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985).




Giving an area of origin the authority to override existing
water rights of exporters inserts an unnecessary element of
instability in the system. The conditions under which such
priorities could be claimed are unclear. Large water projects
require reasonable certainty regarding such things as project
life to assure financing. Moreover, when areas become dependent
on the imported water, they are likely to resist giving up this
water. Such an approach tends to generate unnecessary uncertain
ty and potential conflict.
2. Reservation. A second allocation approach involves
reserving some share of the water for use only in that area or,
conversely, allowing exportation only of so-called surplus
water. The most formal method of reservation involves specific
assignment of waters to an area of origin. For example,
California has used its authority to condition assignment of
state-held water rights under Water Code section 10505 to
specifically reserve a portion of the water for the county of
origin.24 ^ New Mexico statute recognizes a "natural right" to a
23See, e.g., 25 Op. Cal. Attfy Gen. 8, 21 (1955): "As the
need of such an inhabitant develops he must comply with the
general water law of the state... to apply for and perfect a
water right for water which he then needs and can put to bene
ficial use. ... Specifically, this means that if, prior to the
development of the applicant's increased needs, the authority had
been exporting from the watershed in question water required to
supply the applicant's increased needs, such use by the authority
would not justify denial of the application."
24gee Robie & Kletzing, supra note 1, at 431 and note 57
where they describe two assignments of state water applications
to the Bureau of Reclamation in which specific portions of that
11
"reasonable share" of the water originating in the upper reaches
of stream systems for the residents of those areas.25 More
commonly, the process involves a review of transfers to assure
that some reasonable amount remains in the area of origin.
A Texas statute passed in 1965 restricts the Texas Water
Development Board from developing any plan for a transbasin
diversion "if the water supply involved in such a plan or
project will be required to supply the reasonably foreseeable
future water requirements for the next ensuing fifty-year period
within the river basin of origin...."26 jn effect, this statute
creates a reservation of water needed in areas of origin for a
50-year period as against state sponsored or funded water
development.27
Oklahoma law contains the following provision:
In the granting of water rights for the
transportation of water for use outside the
water were reserved for the counties of origin.
25n.m. Stat. Ann. §72-5-29 (1978). There is no reported
litigation applying this statute. Its apparent intent was to
protect early settlers who may have neglected to comply with
state water law to perfect their rights. See, E. Clark, Water
Rights Problems in the Upper Rio Grande Watershed and Adjoining
Areas, 11 Natural Res. J. 48 (1971).
26 ch. 297, §2 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 588, codified at
Tex. Water Code Ann. §16.052 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
27Johnson & Knippa, "Transbasin Diversion of Water," 43
Texas L. Rev. 1035, 1051 (1969): "Termed derisively by some as
the 'fifty-year lockup,1 these provisions evidently are intended
to assure originating areas sufficient water to meet their
anticipated needs for a period of fifty years following the
planning of a transbasin project by the Water Development Board
or following the decision to finance such a project with state
funds."
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stream system wherein water originates,
applicants within such stream system shall
have a right to all of the water required to
adequately supply the beneficial needs of
water users therein. The Board shall review
the needs within such area of origin every
five (5) years.28
Although the declared policy of the State is "to encourage the
use of surplus and excess water to the extent that the use
thereof is not required by people residing within the area where
such water originates, "29 a subsequent paragraph adds: "Only
excess and surplus water should be utilized outside the areas of
origin and citizens within the areas of origin have a prior right
to water originating therein to the extent that it may be
required for beneficial use therein."30 The Oklahoma Water
Resources Board has defined excess and surplus water as "that
amount of water which is greater than the present or reasonable
forseeable [sic] future water requirements needed to satisfy all
beneficial uses within an area of origin."31
2882 O.S. 1981 §105.12 (4).
2982 O.S. 1981 §1086.1
31Oklahoma Water Resources Board Rules, Regulations and
Modes of Procedure §125.1 (1979 Revision). In a case that has
been before the Oklahoma Supreme Court for two years, one of the
issues is whether out-of-basin diversions remain subject to
possible "recall" by subsequent appropr iators in the basin of
origin. Oklahoma Water Resources Board v. Franco-American
Charolaise, Ltd. et. al.,Case No. 59, 310. The Board's position
Is that protection is provided only to those in the area of
origin holding water rights or applications for water rights at
the time of application for an out-of-basin diversion. Brief of
Appellant, Oklahoma Water Resource Board (May 31, 1983) at 37.
The Oklahoma District Court had decided that the rights being
sought in this case must be made "subject to recall" by subse-
13
In an interstate context, waters have been formally allo
cated by two general means--interstate compacts and court
decreed equitable apportionment. The Colorado River Compact of
192232 is the classic example of an interstate compact one of the
major purposes of which was to protect the future availability of
water for the areas of origin of the Colorado River. Colorado
and other upper basin states were concerned that the rapid growth
in southern California would result in full appropriation of the
Colorado River leaving nothing for their own later development.
The permanent division of water incorporated into the compact
arrangement was intended to protect development interests in
these upstream states.33
Since the 1907 case of Kansas v. Colorado34 the U.S. Supreme
Court has taken original jurisdiction in litigation between
states regarding interstate waters. In general, the Court has
applied the law of prior appropriation in cases involving states
recognizing this doctrine.35 NOt surprisingly, emphasis is
quent users within the stream system of origin.
3270 Cong. Rec. 324(1928), approved by Congress in the
Boulder Canyon Project Act, Ch. 42, 613, 45 Stat. 1064 (1928), 43
U.S.C. §617(1) (1982) .
33jndeed the lower basin states have long since diverted
their full entitlement of 7.5 million acre-feet per year while
the upper basin states have yet to apply their full share to
beneficial use.
34206 U.S. 46 (1907) .
35see the excellent discussion by Tarlock, "The Law of
Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated and Restated," 56
U. of Colo. L. Rev. 381 (1985) .
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generally on protection of existing uses and provision for
apparent new uses. Area of origin protection has not played a
significant role in court decisions under this doctrine.
As demonstrated in the interstate context by the Colorado
River, formal reservation of water can assure the future avail
ability of water for slower-developing areas of origin. At the
same time such an approach creates inflexibility. It is diffi
cult to project the amount of water that may be needed in such
areas of origin. Reservations or apportionments that are fixed
become difficult to change even if they no longer make sense.
3. Evaluation. A third general allocation method is to
evaluate transbasin diversions on the basis of a number of
general standards. Reservation of water is not involved. In
appropriation states following the permit system, water rights
are established through application with the appropriate state
agency. While the requirements vary considerably from state to
state, in each case certain conditions must be met.36
In some states, specific provisions address interbasin
transfers. A 1981 Nebraska law specifically subjects all
proposed interbasin transfers to a public interest review by the
example, in states like Wyoming the considerations are
limited to a demonstration that the diversion of water is taking
place and that the water is being applied to a recognized
beneficial use. See Wolfe, "Administering Water Rights: The
Permit System," paper presented at Western Water Law in
Transition Conference (Natural Resources Law Center, U. of
Colorado, June 3-5, 1985). Other states address a broader set of
considerations including, in some cases, a general "public
interest" standard. See, e.g. Alaska Stat. 46.15.080 (1982);
Neb. Stat. S 46-235 (1984); N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-5-7 (1978).
15
Director of Water Resources.37 A number of factors are listed
for consideration, though others also may be raised:
1. The economic, environmental, and other benefits of
the proposed interbasin transfer and use;
2. Any adverse impacts of the proposed interbasin
transfer and use;
3. Any current beneficial uses being made of the
unappropriated water in the basin of origin;
4. Any reasonably foreseeable future beneficial uses
of water in the basin of origin;
5. The economic, environmental, and other benefits of
leaving the water in the basin of origin for current
or future beneficial uses;
6. Alternative sources of water supply available to
the applicant; and
7. Alternative sources of water available to the basin
of origin for future beneficial uses.38
A cost-benefit analysis from the state perspective is to be
undertaken, and the application is to be denied "if the benefits
to the state from granting the application do not outweigh the
benefits to the state from denying the application."39
37Nebraska Laws 1981, LB252, §6, Neb. Rev. Stat. §46-289
(1984) . The first such review under this statute has just been
completed. In the Matter of Application A-15738 for a Permit to
Divert Water"from the South Platte River for Storage in Enders
Reservoir (Nov. 4, 1985).
38 id.
39^. Kansas passed a law in 1983 that follows a very
similar approach respecting all proposed diversions of at least
1,000 acre-feet of water per year for use more than 10 miles from
the point of diversion. Kansas Laws 1983, Ch. 341, codified at
K.S.A. l82a-1501-1506 (1984). One additional factor of interest
is "conservation practice implementation plans for the use of
water currently available to and being used by the applicant and
for the use of the water proposed to be transferred."
K.S.A. §82a-1503(d)(6) (1984).
16
A Texas law originally passed in 1913 now provides that
[n]o person may take or divert any of the
water of the ordinary flow, underflow, or
storm flow of any stream, watercourse, or
watershed in this state into any other
natural stream, watercourse, or watershed in
this state into any other natural stream,
watercourse, or watershed to the prejudice of
any person or property situated within the
water shed from which the water is proposed
to be taken or diverted.40
A 1966 Texas Supreme Court decision held that prejudice is to be
determined by weighing the detriments to the basin of origin
against the benefits of the diversion.41 The Court concluded
that this law prohibited an out of basin diversion "only to the
extent such diversion would impair water rights in existence at
the time of the proposed diversion."42 The prejudice standard
permits consideration of reasonable future needs as one of the
factors to be evaluated in the permit review by the Texas Water
Rights Commission.
The evaluation approach provides some administrative
protection for areas of origin. The extent of that protection
depends on the evaluation factors to be considered in permitting
transbasin diversions and in the weight to be accorded these
factors. The Nebraska approach requires consideration of the
adverse impacts on the area of origin but evaluates these impacts
40Texas Water Code Ann. §11.085 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
41City of San Antonio v. Water Comm'n, 407 S.W.2d 752, 759
(Tex. 1966). See also, City of Trisco v. Texas Water Rights
Comm'n, 579 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
42 id.
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in relation to the general benefits expected from the diversion.
Presumably, mitigation of unacceptable impacts can be required
before a permit will be issued. If no artificial reservations of
water are included, flexibility is retained in the system.
C. Compensation
The third general approach taken to address area of origin
concerns emphasizes compensation. Rather than reserving water,
the intent is to make the area of origin better off through
provision of benefits that at least offset the costs imposed by
the diversion. California took this approach in developing its
State Water Project. The Burns-Porter Act, passed in 1959 to
create funding for the Project, contained several provisions
intended to compensate northern California for the loss of
water. One form of compensation was funding for local needs
including flood control.43 In addition, the Act established a
grants program for recreation and fish enhancement and a loans
program for small projects and rehabilitation of domestic water
systems.44 It should be noted, however, that this law retained
the permanent priority status to exported water for residents of
the areas of origin discussed previously.45
The 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act adopted a compen
sation approach to address area of origin concerns. Section
43Cal. Water Code §12938 (West 1971).
44Cal. Water Code §§12934(d)(6), 12880-12893 (West 1971).
text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
18
203(a) of the Act provides:
In the event that the Secretary
shall... plan works to import water into the
Colorado River system from sources outside
the natural drainage areas of the system, he
shall make provision for adequate and
equitable protection of the interests of the
States and areas of origin, including
assistance from funds specified in this Act
to the end that water supplies may be
available for use in such states and areas of
origin adequate to satisfy their ultimate
requirements at prices to users not adversely
affected by the exportation of water to the
Colorado River system.46
The intention was to create a fund of money that could be used to
provide water to future users in exporting areas at a reasonable
cost.47
The Colorado approach, discussed in detail in Section V
below, requires a form of compensation for certain transbasin
diversions. A 1943 Colorado law requires the diversion facili
ties for conservancy district projects taking water out of the
Colorado River basin to incorporate features that will protect
present and future consumptive water uses in that basin and that
will not increase the cost of that water.48 Tne practical effect
of this provision has been to cause the importing conservancy
district to build additional storage reservoirs on the West Slope
46Colorado River Basin Project Act, P.L. 90-537, §203(a), 43
U.S.C. §1513(a) (1982) .
47Apparently, the Development Fund was never adequately
financed. See Legal Study No. 7, supra note 1, at 104. More
over, plans to bring water from the Pacific Northwest into
the Colorado River Basin have been postponed indefinitely.
48Ch. 192, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 635, Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-
45-118(b) (IV) (1973).
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to provide "compensatory storage" for use in this area.
Because of legislation passed by the rural-dominated New
York State Legislature limiting the ability of New York City to
take land in upstate counties for its water system unless full
compensation is paid, the city enacted a provision governing its
approach in such matters.49 According to Sax:
In New York the cost of diversion is made
even greater by a statutory provision which,
in addition to allowing compensation to the
owners of riparian land, requires that the
owner of any real estate taken by the city
which has been directly or indirectly
decreased in value by the execution of any
plans for additional water supply by the city
shall have the right to recover damages for
such decrease in value. This provision
guarantees compensation to nonriparians who
have made use of the river, as well as to
business and property owners whose values are
diminished simply by the fact that the use of
the river is affected.50
The courts have taken a broad view of the interests that may be
compensable under this provision.
Compensation recognizes that the diversion of water from an
area entails real costs and that offsetting payments may be
devised that will benefit the exporting area and leave it at
least as well off as a result of the diversion. Inclusion of
these payments in the cost of the diversion better reflects the
true cost of the project. Water is not artificially reserved for
49Administrative Code of the City of New York, K51-44.0.
SOjoseph L. Sax, Water Law, Planning and Policy (Bobbs-
Merrill, 1968) at 200.
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unknown future uses.51 At the same time, there are a number of
problems associated with the compensation approach. In the
absence of a market, who determines what the costs of the
diversion are and how much compensation should be paid? What
form should the compensation take? To whom is the compensation
paid? These questions are addressed more fully below.52
V. THE COLORADO APPROACH
A. General Colorado Doctrine
The seminal case of Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co.53 involved
a diversion of water out of one drainage into an adjacent
watershed. To the argument that such a diversion was unlawful
the Colorado Supreme Court replied: "In the absence of legisla
tion to the contrary, we think that the right to water acquired
by priority of appropriation thereof is not in any way dependent
upon the 1ocus of its application to the beneficial use
designed."54 The Court went on to discuss the numerous benefits
resulting from a rule allowing the movement of water to locations
where it can be beneficially applied.
More recently, the Colorado Supreme Court again was pre
sented with the question of the legality of out-of-basin diver-
51of course, the Colorado approach of building compensatory
storage reservoirs does have the effect of apparently dedicating
this water to as yet unknown West Slope uses.
52gee especially Section VI infra.
536 Colo. 443 (1882) .
. at 449. (emphasis in original) .
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sions--this time concerning a proposed project that would take
water from the Colorado River basin across the mountains to
Colorado Springs and Aurora, In an unequivocal statement the
Court noted:
We find nothing in the Constitution
which even intimates that waters should be
retained for use in the watershed where
originating.
The waters here involved are the
property of the public, not any segment
thereof, nor are they dedicated to any
geographical portion of the state.
The right to appropriate water and put
the same to beneficial use at any place in
the state is no longer to open to question.55
Thus the general rule in Colorado is that water may be diverted
without geographic restriction so long as it is applied to a
beneficial use.
B. The Conservancy District Exception
1. Historical Setting. The earliest transmountain diver
sions in Colorado involved small projects built by private
groups. In the 1920's the city of Denver began development of a
large transmountain diversion project involving construction of a
tunnel under the Continental Divide. Agricultural interests in
the northern Front Range became interested in pursuing federal
funding to help build a project to divert water from Grand
Lake at the head of the Colorado River to the eastern slope by
means of a tunnel. These interests joined together as the
55Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Association v. Colorado
River Water Conservation District, 148 Colo. 173, 202, J65 P.2d
273, 288-89(1961) .
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Northern Colorado Water Users Association in 1934. Concern about
the potential adverse impacts on the West Slope of Colorado of
this plan prompted the creation of the Colorado River Protective
Association in that same year.
A year earlier, representatives from across the state had
met to discuss federal funding for Colorado water projects. The
meeting resulted in a five point resolution, one of which
endorsed the concept of "compensatory storage":
Fourth, endorsement of the general principle
that every transmountain diversion project
out of the Colorado River basin, other than
domestic projects of municipalities, shall
include as an essential part of the project
construction of a compensatory reservoir on
the Western Slope of sufficient capacity to
hold an amount of water equal to the amount
to be annually diverted unless some compen
sating reservoirs have been previously
built.s6
Several points are worth noting. First, the diversions requiring
compensatory storage would be only those from the Colorado River
basin. Second, "domestic projects of municipalities" were
excluded. Third, the compensatory storage was to be in an amount
equal to the amount diverted. In the negotiations regarding
construction of what came to be known as the Colorado Big
Thompson (CBT) Project that ensued over the following four years,
the major issue was the amount of compensatory storage to be
built.
56From Rocky Mountain News, September 28, 1933, quoted in
Hobbs, "Green Mountain Reservoir: Lock or Key?" paper presented
at Colorado Water Congress Annual Convention, Feb. 23-24, 1984,
p.6 [hereinafter Hobbs].
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Although Colorado law presented no obstacle to transmountain
diversions, the necessity to obtain federal funds greatly
strengthened the bargaining position of the West Slope whose
congressional representative was powerfully situated:
At the time the foregoing developments
occurred, one individual representing the
West Slope assumed an outstanding role as
protector of that area. Congressman
Edward T. Taylor, as Chairman of the Appro
priation Committee of the House, was, by
virtue of his position, able to enforce his
edicts and to preclude the development of any
publicly financed project which would divert
water from his congressional district to the
East Slope, unless the proponents of such
project were willing to make such concessions
as he deemed necessary.57
The position of West Slope interests was further spelled out in
1935 in the so-called "Delaney Resolution." As summarized by
Beise:
This resolution acknowledged that all
sections of Colorado concede to the area
wholly dependent on the Colorado River for
water, a prior right to such water then
available as was reasonably necessary for the
continued growth and development of the
western part of the state; that there was no
legal method whereby one part of the state
could make a binding agreement with another
portion of the state to settle the question;
that, in the absence of comprehensive
surveys, it was reasonable to assume that the
West Slope would ultimately use one-half of
the water allocated to Colorado from the
Colorado River, and, accordingly, to effectu
ate such assumption every plan for transmoun
tain diversions should incorporate as an
integral part thereof at its expense compen
satory storage equal to the amount to




By this means, the West Slope hoped to effectively assure that it
would maintain rights to a larger share of the water in the
Colorado River basin and that the costs of building storage for
that water would be borne by East Slope interests.
In 1936 the Bureau of Reclamation completed plans for the
CBT Project. Negotiations were then able to move to more
specific concerns. An agreement was reached regarding "Manner of
Operation of Project Facilities" which incorporated a number of
protective conditions. Congressional authorization of the CBT
Project in 1937 spelled out this agreement in Senate Document
80.59
The CBT Project was expected to divert about 320,000 acre-
feet per year. As part of the project the proponents agreed to
build the Green Mountain Reservoir to provide water needed to
protect West Slope interests. The reservoir capacity of 152,000
acre-feet was to be utilized to replace any out-of-priority
diversions required for the CBT (52,000 acre-feet) and to
generate power and supply other beneficial uses in western
Colorado (100,000 acre feet).60 The purposes to be achieved by
58id. at 456.
5975th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
60As is often the case in such situations, much of the
concern of the West Slope representatives arose out of uncertain
ty about the impacts of the proposed diversion. Protective
stipulations satisfactory to all concerned were able to be
developed once the needs were better understood. For a descrip
tion of the specific issues, see, Dille, A Brief History of the
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District and The Colorado-Big
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operations of the Green Mountain Reservoir are:
1. To preserve the vested and future rights [of the West
Slope] in irrigation.
2. To preserve the fishing and recreational facilities and
the scenic attractions of Grand Lake, the Colorado River,
and the Rocky Mountain National Park.
3. To preserve the present surface elevations of the water
in Grand Lake and to prevent a variation in these elevations
greater than their normal fluctuation.
4. To so conserve and make use of these waters for
irrigation, power, industrial development, and other
purposes, as to create the greatest benefits.
5. To maintain conditions of river flow for the benefit of
domestic and sanitary uses of this water.61
Other conditions of the agreement provided that diversions would
be subject to the provisions of the Colorado River Compact, that
an irrigation system for meadow lands in the vicinity of
Kremmling would be provided, that the domestic water supplies of
Kremmling and Hot Sulphur Springs would be protected and that
Grand County would be paid $100,000 for estimated loss of tax
revenues from the lands to be innundated.62
The need in Colorado to have entities capable of entering
into repayment contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation for large
water projects led to the passage of the Water Conservancy Act of
1937.63 This law permitted creation of special conservancy
districts with authority to tax all property within their
Thompson Project (1958), esp. pp. 15-16.
6lHobbs, supra note 55 at 9-10.
62oille, supra note 59, at 16.
63Ch. 266, 1937 Colo. Sess. Laws 1309.
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boundaries.64
The 1937 Act contained the following restriction:
Provided, however, that not to exceed an
annual average amount of 320,000 acre-feet of
water, for any period of five consecutive
years, reckoned in continuing progressive
series, beginning with the first year of
transmountain diversion of water, shall be
transported from the watershed of any and all
rivers subject to the Colorado River Compact
and the Boulder Canon Act. (U.S.C. Title 43,
Sections 617 to 617-t) by all districts
organized or to be organized under this Act,
collectively, until such time as a division
of water allocated to the several upper basin
states under said Compact has been made under
agreement between said states, or otherwise
determined.65
Since the CBT Project was expected to divert 320,000 acre-feet,
this provision effectively precluded any other transmountain
diversions out of the Colorado River basin by other conservancy
districts.
2. The Law. After six years of discussion and negotia
tion, the legislature removed this restriction and replaced it
with the following provision that is still the law today:
Provided, however, that any works or
facilities planned and designed for the
exportation of water from the natural basin
of the Colorado River and its tributaries in
Colorado, by any district created under this
^irrigation districts are able only to tax landowners with
irrigable acreage within the district to repay bonds.
Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-41-121 and §37-42-126(a) (1973). The
broader taxing authority for conservancy districts vastly
increased the potential ability to finance water projects.
Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-45-121 to 125 (1973 & Supp. 1984).
65Ch. 266 §13, 1937 Colo. Sess. Laws 1309, 1325.
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Act, shall be subject to the provisions of
the Colorado River Compact and the Boulder
Canyon Project Act, as amended; that any such
works or facilities shall be designed,
constructed and operated in such a manner
that the present appropriations of water, and
in addition thereto prospective uses of water
for irrigation and other beneficial
consumptive-use purposes, including consump
tive uses for domestic, mining, and industri
al purposes, within the natural basin of the
Colorado River in the State of Colorado, from
which water is exported, will not be impaired
nor increased in cost at the expense of the
water users within the said natural basin;
and that the facilities and other means for
the accomplishment of said purpose shall be
incorporated in, and made a part of, any
project plans for the exportation of water
from said natural basin in Colorado.66
Thus, that portion of the West Slope encompassing the Colorado
River basin is to be protected from certain adverse effects
connected with exportation of water by conservancy districts. In
particular, existing uses are not to be impaired or increased
in cost. The same protection is accorded to "prospective uses
of water for irrigation and other beneficial consumptive-use
purposes." The means of assuring these protections are to be
included in the plans for any transbasin diversion proposed by a
conservancy district.
Several points should be noted. First, as has been stated,
these restrictions are limited only to diversions by conservancy
districts. Thus, cities such as Denver, Colorado Springs, and
Aurora are not required to provide such protections. Second, the
prospective uses of water that are protected are limited to
66Ch. 192, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 635, 636, codified at
Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-45-118(b)(IV) (1973).
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consumptive uses. Thus water needed for power generation and the
maintenance of instream flows may not be included.6? Third, the
requirement that present and prospective uses are not to be
impaired or increased in cost has generally been thought to mean
that a compensatory reservoir must be constructed on the West
Slope.68
3. Judicial Interpretation. Reference has already been
made to the case of Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Association
v. Colorado River Water Conservation District6^ in which the
Colorado Supreme Court concluded unequivocably that water may be
diverted and applied to a beneficial use anywhere in the state.70
The entities proposing diversions from the West Slope in that
Beise, supra note 56, at 458: "The popular concept and
application of these words would be to exclude power genera
tion and maintenance of public streams for fishing and scenic
attractions, but to include irrigation, domestic, and manufactur
ing uses of the water."
68fts Beise notes, exportation of water necessarily reduces
available supplies. "Therefore, a practical interpretation of
the Act is that a project proposing to divert water from the
Colorado River Basin must construct a compensatory reservoir
which will leave the West Slope in as good condition for present
and future development purposes as if the transporting project
had not been constructed and the river involved had remained
unregulated." ^d. at 459. Beise goes on to point out the
substantial uncertainty involved in determining whether a
diversion project will increase the costs of future water uses on
the West Slope.
note 54.
is not clear from the opinion what the legal basis was
for the argument that the City of Denver cannot engage in
tr ansmounta in diversions. Apparently, it was not based on an
argument that Denver should be covered by the Colorado statute
governing conservancy districts.
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case were all cities.
A major challenge to the constitutionality of the Colorado
area of origin protection statute was raised in Central Colorado
Water Conservancy District v. Colorado River Water Conservation
District.71 There the conservancy district argued that the
Colorado constitutional provision guaranteeing that "[t]he right
to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to
beneficial uses shall never be denied"72 precluded the restric
tions contained in the conservancy district statute. The Court
avoided this constitutional issue by noting that such districts
are instrumentalities of the state and that their authority is
completely established by, and limited to, the statute that
creates them. The Court stated: "To say that the legislature
cannot impose conditions upon this creature of statute before it
could divert water from a natural basin to the district flies in
the face of well settled principles of constitutional law."73
In the case of Colorado River Water Conservation District
v. Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
Distr ict74 the Colorado Supreme Court addressed what a conser
vancy district must do to comply with the planning requirements
of the protection provision. At issue was the plan submitted by
71186 Colo. 193, 526 P.2d 302 (1974).
72Article XVI, Sec. 6, Constitution of Colorado.
73Central Colorado Water Conservancy District v. Colorado
River Water Conservation Board, 186 Colo. 193, 195-196, 526 P.2d
302, 304 (1974).
74198 Colo. 352, 610 P.2d 81 (1979).
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the Municipal Subdistrict of the Northern Colorado Water Conser
vancy District in conjunction with its application for a condi
tional decree for the proposed Windy Gap project. The Court
first held that the project plans for accomplishing the protec
tion purposes of the statute must be prepared and submitted to
the water court before a conditional decree may be granted.75
The Court then found the plan that had been submitted to be
insufficient and held that "[t]he plan required by subparagraph
IV must be at least as detailed as that necessary to document the
elements of an appropriation."76 jn particular, the Court
emphasized the need for such plans to manifest a "physical
demonstration of the design, construction, and operational
aspects of" the proposed diversion facilities that will achieve
the protections required by the statute.77
4. Other Experience with Compensatory Storage. In addition
to the CBT Project, two other transmountain diversion projects
have been built by conservancy districts involving water from the
Colorado River basin. The first was the Fryingpan-Arkansas
Project. Beginning in the 1920ls, agricultural interests in the
Arkansas River valley sought to supplement irrigation water
supplies. 78 Bureau of Reclamation investigations began in the
late 1930fs. The project that was finally approved and funded by
75id. at 356 and 84.
76id at 357 and 84.
77id. at 358 and 85.
78<rerence Brace, "The History of the Fryingpan-Arkansas
Project" (undated) at 1.
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Congress in 1962 involved the diversion of about 69,000 acre-feet
per year of water from Hunter Creek and the Roaring Fork River in
the Colorado River basin to the Arkansas River for the benefit
and use of the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy
District.?9
A major issue in obtaining congressional support for the
project concerned protection of West Slope interests.79 m the
"Operating Principles, Fryingpan-Arkansas Project" adopted
in 1959 and incorporated into the federal legislation funding the
projectSO it is stated that one of the purposes of the project is
the "protection of western Colorado water uses, both existing and
potential, in accordance with the declared policy of the State of
Colorado."8^ The means of providing that protection was to be
construction of the Ruedi Reservoir on the Fryingpan River with a
capacity of at least 100,000 acre-feet. A portion of that water
79^£. at 42. See also Fryingpan-Arkansas Project (Letter
from ActTng Secretary of the Interior Transmitting Report on the
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, Colorado, Pursuant to Section 9(A) of
the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (53 Stat. 1187)) (June 18,
1953) .
this time the Congressional representative for the West
Slope was Wayne Aspinall, chairman in the early 1950 fs of the
Reclamation Committee and later chairman of the Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee. Just as with Representative Taylor in
the 1930's, without Representative Aspinall's support, no bill
funding this project could hope to pass in the House. Thus the
West Slope wielded substantial leverage in the discussions
concerning protection of its interests. Brace, supra note 77,
at 21.
80P.L. 87-590, 76 Stat. 389 (1962).
^Operating Principles Fryingpan-Arkansas Project,
H.R. Doc. No. 130, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961), at 1.
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is dedicated to replacement of any senior West Slope water rights
affected by project diversions. The remainder is available for
other municipal and industrial uses on the West Slope.82
The other transmountain diversion involving the statutory
basin of origin protection is the Windy Gap project.83 Some of
the storage and transportation facilities of the Colorado-Big
Thompson project are utilized to transport water from the
Colorado River to primarily municipal users on the East Slope.
This totally private project is being funded, constructed, and
operated by the Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District.84 ^n average annual water supply of 54,000
acre-feet will be furnished by the project.
Initially, the Municipal Subdistrict took the position that
Green Mountain Reservoir already satisfied the requirements of
the basin of origin protection provision.85 However, the
^correspondence contained in Ruedi Dam and Reservoir,
Colo. (Letter from Acting Secretary of the Interior Transmitting
A Report and Findings on Ruedi Dam and Reservoir, Colo., Pursuant
to the Federal Reclamation Laws) (March 7, 1960) specifically
discusses the expected water needs associated with oil shale
development in western Colorado.
of the following information came from John M. Sayre,
"The Windy Gap Project: A Case Study," Presentation at New
Sources of Water for Energy Development and Growth: Interbasin
Transfers Conference (Natural Resources Law Center, U. of
Colo. School of Law) (June 9, 1982).
84Included are the cities of Boulder, Greeley, Longmont,
Estes Park, and Loveland and the Platte River Power Authority.
85The CBT project was originally planned to divert 310,000
acre-feet. Green Mountain was designed accordingly. In fact, an
annual average of 250,000 acre-feet of water has been diverted by
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Colorado Supreme Court, in a case previously notedr86 disagreed
and required the Subdistrict to develop a specific plan consti
tuting "a physical demonstration of the design, construction and
operational aspects of diversion facilities required by subpara-
graph IV."87
Negotiations ensued between the Municipal Subdistrict and
the Colorado River Water Conservation District (River District)
beginning in December, 1979. John Sayre provides an excellent
account of these negotiations, discussing the concerns of the
various West Slope interests and the settlements eventually
reached to satisfy these concerns.88 t0 summarize briefly,
concerns about possible increases in salinity were addressed by
paying Grand County $25,000 to conduct salinity studies; concerns
by the Town of Hot Sulphur Springs about its water supply and
sewage systems were met by payments of $150,000 for improvements
to its water treatment facility and $270,000 for improvements in
its waste water treatment facility; concerns by ranchers about
this project. Since Windy Gap was a project of entities within
the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District and since the
additional diversions still would not bring the total to more
than the originally planned 310,000 acre-feet, the Subdistrict
considered that its obligations were already satisfied by Green
Mountain Reservoir.
86colorado River Water Conservation District v. Municipal
Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, supra
note 73.
£. at 358 and 85.
88See supra note 83. See also "Agreement Concerning the
Windy Gap Project and the Azure Reservoir and Power Project"
(April 30, 1980) and "Supplement to Agreement of April 30, 1980"
(March 29, 1985) .
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possible adverse effects on diversions of senior downstream
rights brought a guarantee that the Subdistrict would build any
additional facilities that might be needed; concerns by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Colorado Division of
Wildlife regarding potential adverse impacts on fish were
addressed by guaranteeing certain minimum streamflows below the
reservoir site and donating $550,000 to FWS for work to protect
two species of endangered fishes downstream in the Colorado
River; concerns by Grand County and the Middle Park Water
Conservancy District regarding availability of water for future
development in this area were met by agreeing to provide an
additional 3,000 acre-feet of water for this purpose.
The major issue was how to satisfy the protection provision
in the Conservancy Act. Under the initial settlement, the
Subdistrict agreed to construct the Azure Reservoir and Power
Project on the Colorado River. Expected maximum capacity was
28,000 to 30,000 acre-feet with the water rights held by the
River District. This agreement was modified in March, 1985 to
provide that the Subdistrict pay the River District a sum of
$10,200,000 which the District will use to plan and construct a
water storage project or projects in Water Division No. 5 "which
will satisfy the Subdistrict's obligation under C.R.S. §37-45-
118(1) (b) (IV) . ..."89 In addition, the Subdistrict agreed to
subordinate its project water rights to permit filling of the
89"Supplement to Agreement of April 30, 1980," supra note 88
at 12 (paragraph 17).
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project or projects constructed by the River District.^O
C. An Evaluation of the Colorado Approach
Colorado has adequate supplies of water to meet its foresee
able needs if these supplies can be made available at the point
of demand. Transbasin diversions have represented a significant
source of supply in this state.91 with the withdrawal of federal
subsidies and the addition of numerous environmental restric
tions, the cost to the builder of these projects has increased
markedly. Nevertheless, such projects still represent a potenti
ally important source of supply.
It seems evident from an examination of the circumstances
surrounding the origination of the Colorado provision for basin
of origin protection that compensatory storage was agreed to
because federal funding was available to build the entire
transbasin diversion project including the additional storage.
As discussed, the bargaining position of the West Slope was
exceptionally strong because of the position of its congressional
representatives. As a result, two major storage projects have
been built without cost to the West Slope. At the same time, the
9°Ic3. at 5 (paragraph 3) .
^According to one source, an average of 540,000 acre-feet
per year (based on 1979 conditions) is imported from other river
basins in Colorado. Colorado Water Study: Background Volume
(Colorado Department of Natural Resources, September 1981 at 12,
Table 3.) Most of this water is diverted from the upper Colorado
River basin to the front range. Since the annual consumptive use
of water in Colorado is estimated at about 5.2 million acre-feet,
transbasin diversions represent about ten percent of total
consumption.
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East Slope conservancy districts gained access to exceedingly low
cost federal funding and construction support. It was a deal no
one could turn down.
Seen in this light, it is clear why the Colorado law is
aimed only at conservancy districts. These entities were
authorized specifically to be able to, tap into federal reclama
tion funding. Federal largess enabled the additional cost
represented by compensatory storage to be more easily absorbed
into project costs. Since the City of Denver was financing its
projects without federal support it was excluded from having to
provide compensatory storage.
With major federal financing for water storage projects no
longer available it is time to reevaluate the compensatory
storage concept. Such projects are expensive to build. There
are few remaining sites that are both technically desirable and
environmentally and politically acceptable. Apparently little
demand has yet developed for the storage already constructed.92
Of course, the law itself does not require construction of
compensatory storage. It only requires that present appropria
tion and prospective consumptive uses of water not be "impaired
nor increased in cost at the expense of the water users within
92m 1984 Exxon obtained the first long-term service
contract from the Bureau of Reclamation for 7,200 acre-feet of
water from Ruedi Reservoir to be used in connection with its
Colony Oil Shale Project. Porzak, "Innovative Transfer and
Exchange Plans," Paper presented at Conference on Colorado Water
Issues and Options, October 9, 1985 at 9.
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the said natural basin."93 The provision then refers to the
facilities "and other means" that will be utilized to accomplish
this purpose. When the Bureau of Reclamation was building such
projects it may have made sense to satisfy this requirement
through compensatory storage. Now, however, it is time to
consider some alternative approaches.
The requirement that present appropriations of water not be
impaired or increased in cost can be addressed through mitigation
measures determined by engineering and hydrologic studies of
project effects. As the Windy Gap example has shown, potentially
impacted interests are likely to come forward to seek protec
tion. In that case, mitigation and compensation measures were
agreed to through a negotiation process.
The protection to be accorded to prospective consumptive use
of water is more problematic. Such prospective uses are inher
ently speculative. It is difficult to know now how to insure
that such unknown uses will not be impaired or increased in
cost. Compensatory storage does address this concern but at a
cost that may no longer be acceptable. Rather than committing
limited resources to such projects it may make more sense to
establish a development fund, the money from which would be
available to provide assistance for future water needs in the
basin of origin.94
93Colo. Rev. Stat. §37-45-118(b)(IV) (1973).
^Governor Lamm has recommended a "basin of origin equity
fund." ("Whose Water Will It Be/What Future Does It Shape for
Colorado?" Presentation at Tenth Annual Water Workshop,
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Moreover, it seems unwise to focus only on prospective
consumptive uses. Many feel that the economic future of the West
Slope is tied largely to recreation. In this context it may be
that instream flows will be more important in the future than
traditional consumptive uses such as agriculture.
As noted, the Colorado provision applies only to the upper
Colorado River basin. As a matter of general principle, there is
no reason why some form of protection should not be provided to
any basin of origin. Moreover, there is no good reason to limit
Gunnison, Colorado, July 31, 1985). As developed in testimony by
David Getches, this approach would incorporate the following
elements:
* For every acre-foot of water diverted out of a
primary river basin each year, an export fee (to be set
by the legislature, perhaps indexed to the current
price of water in the watershed of origin) will be paid
by the importer.
* Export fees will be held by the state in a special
fund for the exclusive benefit of the specific water
shed of origin.
* Expenditures will be made against the watershed's
funds upon action of the Colorado Water Conservation
Board for projects proposed by municipalities, conser
vancy districts, and other public entities within that
watershed of origin.
* Appropriate expenditures include: new storage
projects; repair and rehabilitation of existing water
storage and delivery facilities; municipal water
systems; improvement of irrigation systems; on-farm
improvements that result in greater efficiency; water-
based recreation facilities; securing instream flows;
and other water-related projects.
* An exporter who has already invested in compensa
tory storage in connection with the particular trans-
basin diversion would be exempt from paying export
charges.
* Export fees will also be imposed on water used
under Colorado water rights for beneficial uses in
other states (whether or not in the watershed of
origin). Testimony by David H. Getches to Interim
Committee of the Colorado Legislature on Water and Land
Issues, Sept. 12, 1985.
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such protection only to projects undertaken by conservancy
districts. The same general issues are raised in any such
diversion.
It has been suggested that the constitutional provision
stating that the "right to divert the unappropriated waters of
any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied"95
limits the legislature's ability to protect basins of origin.96
As discussed, the legality of transbasin diversions is well
established in Colorado.97 However, it is also well established
that the legislature may impose reasonable conditions on the
diversion of water. As the Colorado Supreme Court observed in
1885: "While the legislature cannot prohibit the appropriation
or diversion or unappropriated water, for useful purposes, from
natural streams upon the public domain, that body has the power
to regulate the manner of effecting such appropriation or
diversion."98
The challenge to the 1943 statute restricting transbasin
95Article XVI, Sec. 6, Constitution of Colorado.
96Carlson, "Report to Governor John A. Love on Certain
Colorado Water Law Problems," 50 Denver L. J. 293, 306 (1973).
97See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
98Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. People ex rel. Luthe, 8
Colo. 614, 9 P. 794, 797 (1885) . Cases in which the Colorado
Supreme Court has approved such legislative restrictions are
cited in City and County of Denver v. Bergland, 517 F. Supp. 155
(D. Colo. 1981) at 207 and 208. Note that in Coffin v. Left Hand
Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882) , the Court approved an out-of-
watershed diversion "[i]n the absence of legislation to the
contrary...." See also, Note, "Constitutionality of Colorado
Statutes Providing for Transmountain Water Diversions," 25 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 363, esp. 366-67 (1953)
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diversions by conservancy districts was decided on the grounds of
legislative control over entities created by statute.99 Thus the
question whether the Colorado Constitution prohibits such a
provision for nonstatutorily-created diverters was avoided.
Certainly the Constitution prohibits legislation taking away the
right to divert unappropriated water. Moreover, case law
suggests that there can be no geographic preferences accorded to
would-be appropriators.100 Beyond these limitations, however, it
is evident that the legislature may seek to promote legitimate
state interests by prescribing reasonable conditions on diver
sions. Any legislative scheme aimed at providing protection for
important area of origin interests must be able to meet this
standard.
There may also be some question regarding the status of home
rule cities within any such legislative scheme. Home rule cities
such as Denver and Colorado Springs enjoy a special status under
the Colorado Const i tut ion. 101 As a matter of constitutional
authority they are given the powers "necessary, requisite or
proper for the government and administration of its local and
municipal matters, ...."1°2 The authority of home rule cities
99central Colorado Water Conservancy District v. Colorado
Water Conservation District, 186 Colo. 193, 526 P.2d 302 (1974).
See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
IQOMetropolitan Suburban Water Users Association v. Colorado
River Water Conservation District, 148 Colo. 173, 365 P.2d 273
(1961) .
lOlArticle XX, Constitution of Colorado.
102id. sec. 6.
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regarding their own local and municipal matters is considered
absolute. In a case involving a state statute creating a special
procedure for the use of eminent domain authority by cities to
condemn water rights, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that
condemnation was a matter of local, not statewide, concern since
this authority was specifically granted in the Constitution and
that the statute was not permissible,103
Thus any statute purporting to affect home rule cities must
involve matters of statewide concern in which state legislative
authority is paramount. The administration and management of
Colorado's water resources are governed by
legislatively-established statutes. 104 These statutes contain
conditions regulating the appropriation of water to which home
rule cities, like any other appropriator, must adhere. Unless
the water right matter being legislated invades the zone of
authority reserved for home rule cities--such as condemnation of
water rights--it is likely to fall within the affairs governed by
the state legislature. Nevertheless, since any legislative
scheme involving transbasin diversions is likely to affect the
interest home rule cities may have in obtaining water from
another river basin, a challenge based on the special status
accorded home rule cities is possible.
In summary, the present Colorado approach seems inadequate
103city of Thornton v. Farmers' Reservoir and Irrigation
Co., 575 P.2d 382 (1978).
104<rhe major provisions are found at Colo. Rev. Stat. §§37-
82-101 et seq.
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in several respects. First, it protects only the Colorado River
basin and only as against out-of-basin diversions by conservancy
districts. Second, it provides prospective protection only to
consumptive water uses—neglecting highly valuable recreational
and other instream values. Third, its requirement that consump
tive uses not be increased in cost to future users is both vague
and inappropriate—at least as interpreted to require compensa
tory storage.
VI. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AREA-OF-ORIGIN COMPENSATION
(PROTECTION) SCHEMES
This section presents an economic analysis of the issue
of area of origin compensation. It begins with a consideration
of the rationales for compensation and then presents two con
ditions which must be met for a transbasin diversion to be
economically desirable: (1) that it be the least-cost source of
reliable water supply to the prospective user; and (2) that its
benefits exceed all related costs. Forms of compensation are
then considered. The section ends with a set of general economic
guidelines for designing compensation schemes.
A. Why Compensate Areas of Origin?
Why should the export of water be treated differently from
the export of any natural resource? In forested areas, no
pretense is made of maintaining local lumber or firewood prices
as the area is logged. Local areas are not compensated for the
removal of coal or ores beyond the royalties paid directly to
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resource owners, and there certainly is no guarantee that the
local price of coal won't rise above what it would have been in
the absence of exports. Why is water viewed differently? Two
reasons stand out: (1) water exports usually come from unapprop
riated water, acquisition of which does not require payment to
residents of the basin; and (2) water exports generally do not
provide a continuing base for employment and local taxation as do
mineral or forestry activities. No one gets paid because no one
can get title to unappropriated water without putting it to a
beneficial use. Naturally, water remains unappropriated because
there are no currently profitable uses in the basin. Then, once
the infrastructure for water export is built, no significant
employment is provided.
From an administrative and economic point of view, there are
two reasons for paying some form of compensation: (1) equity to
damaged parties and (2) to make sure that those planning out-of-
basin transfers take into account all of the costs caused by the
proposed transfer. Equity is the more obvious motivation, for if
parties are injured by acts intended to benefit others that are
beyond the injured parties' control and in which they had no
voice, it seems reasonable that the injured parties should be
compensated so they will be no worse off than before. Naturally,
it may be difficult to identify all the injured parties and it
may be equally difficult to quantify an equitable level of
compensation. It is important to note that most transfers are
imposed involuntarily on basin-of-origin occupants. Transfers
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are not usually market transactions that generate explicit
values, and even when market values exist, they may not be good
measures of losses involuntarily assumed by basin occupants.
The second point relates to economic efficiency; decisions
should be made so the excess of benefits generated over costs
incurred is maximized. Since many decisions (including most out-
of-basin transfers) are left to private decision-makers or public
entities below the state level, it is desirable to create a
legal environment in which the decision-making entity must take
into account all costs imposed by their decisions. If out-of-
basin transfers impose costs on the area of origin that are
currently unidentified and/or for which the decision-making unit
has no legal liability, then requiring payment of compensation in
the amount of these costs becomes a way of being sure that those
costs will be taken into account in deciding whether or not to
undertake the transfer. Naturally, if the burden of such a cost
is to be placed on prospective transferers, the amount of
compensation should be limited to the actual costs imposed so
that beneficial transfers are not discouraged.
Closely related to both economic efficiency of transfers and
to equity is the basic Pareto criterion for decision-making: the
only way we can be sure that a new project is socially desirable
is to be sure that no one is made worse off by the project.
Thus, not only must aggregate benefits exceed aggregate costs,
but compensation in the amount of losses must actually be paid to
all losers.
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B. Economically Efficient Transbasin Diversions
We start by considering the conditions that must hold if an
out-of-basin transfer project is to be considered desirable from
an economic point of view. Two conditions are required: (1) the
transfer must be the least-cost alternative for providing that
quantity of water to the users; (2) the benefits to the users
of the transferred water must exceed:
(a) losses to the area of origin (including downstream
basins to which it may be tributary); plus
(b) transfer-related construction and operation costs.105
Although these conditions seem self-evident, they require careful
explication so they can be properly translated into operational
guidelines.
1. Least-Cost Source of Water Supply. The first condition
for evaluating an interbasin transfer is that it should represent
the lowest cost source of water supply available to the importing
conditions closely parallel the economic criteria for
assessing interbasin transfers proposals suggested by the
National Water Commission, supra note 1, at 320:
First, the interbasin transfer proposal
should be the least-cost source of water
supply to serve the purposes at hand.
Second, the value of the water in its new
uses should be greater than the value of
water in its old uses plus the cost of
transfer. In other words, benefits (appro
priately reduced to reflect foregone future
use in the area of origin) should exceed
costs.
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area. As discussed, such transbasin diversions entail real costs
to the area of origin. If other, lower-cost sources of equally
reliable supply can be found, then they should be used. In
either case, the benefits to the area requiring the water remain
the same. It is simply a question of finding the least-cost
means of providing those benefits.
According to the National Water Commission,
All alternative sources of water should be
evaluated and compared. Costs of foregone
future uses in the area of origin and the
environmental costs should be included in the
evaluation. Two basic points of the "least-
cost alternative" criterion are that (1) the
calculation of costs of alternatives should
be made on one, uniform, consistent basis and
(2) all social costs should be included in
the evaluation.106
It may be argued that such an evaluation is unnecessary since,
presumably, the transferring entity is economically rational and
will therefore seek the lowest cost alternative. In the past,
the massive subsidies available in the federal reclamation
program made large-scale transbasin diversion projects artifici
ally attractive. Such subsidies will be far less available in
the future, though many states are looking for ways to develop
other sources of low cost financial support for such projects.
In addition to artificial financial incentives, water-
seeking entities are likely to be influenced by other factors.
For example, there may be institutional and political problems
l°6Howe, Charles W. and K. William Easter, Interbasin
Transfers of Water: Economic Issues and Impacts, Baltimore
Md.: Johns Hopkins Press for Resoruces for the Future, Inc. 1971,
Ch. 6.
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associated with transferring water from existing uses within its
own watershed or basin. Thus, even if there is water available
for transfer from agricultural uses to, say, urban uses, signifi
cant political obstacles may exist. Alternatively, groundwater
resources may be available in considerable supply but legal and
institutional obstacles may constrain access. Still another
alternative may be to meter the use of water and to increase its
price. Even if economically efficient, such an approach may be
considered politically unacceptable. Irrespective of the
apparent impediments, all feasible alternatives should be
included in this evaluation.
2. Benefits Must Exceed Costs. The benefits associated
with out-of basin transfers are frequently taken for granted, the
initiative of the transferor being accepted evidence of the need
for the water. However, in the case of transfers for irrigation
application, benefits to the intended user are frequently
overstated by the existence of price-supprt programs and water
subsidies. Howe and Easter (1971) exhibited the facts that much
of the post-war expansion of irrigation in the western United
States simply displaced other acreage, often in the same coun
ties. That is land was being put into the soil bank program,
while new irrigated acreage was being established next door. The
effects extended to other parts of the country, too, with large
rainfed acreages being displaced in the Southeast and Mississippi
Delta.
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Even in cases of transfer for urban uses, evidence is
sometimes lacking that there is a real demand for the water. The
Windy Gap Project of the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District has been completed, but the member cities don't need the
water and are having difficulty in meeting their project
costs.107
Two major issues arise: determining the appropriate
geographic area within which to measure costs; and defining the
nature of the losses to the area of origin. First, one must
define the area within which costs resulting from a transfer are
measured. These losses could occur far downstream, outside what
people would ordinarily consider the basin of origin. For
example, if Blue River water (tributary to the upper Colorado) is
diverted to the Eastern Slope of the Rockies, some losses might
be incurred on the Blue itself, some on the Colorado mainstem
within the State of Colorado, and some much further downstream,
possibly in Arizona and California.
This is a question of the "accounting stance" that is to be
used to quantify the benefits and costs mentioned in (1) and (2)
above. From a national point of view, any losses caused by the
transfer should be counted as costs of the project. In practice
however, accounting stances are likely to be determined by the
geographic boundaries of public administrative units, from
conservancy districts, to states, regions and the nation.
107Boulder Daily Camera 2/21/83; 10/18/84, p. 4C; 6/28/85;
11/28/85, p. 16B.
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Differences in the consequent costs and benefits frequently lead
to conflicts among jurisdictions over the desirability of various
actions or projects, including the need for compensation. While
it is important to consider all costs and benefits, the following
discussion is largely in terms of a state accounting stance since
state policy is our primary consideration.
Losses to the area of origin are likely to take three main
forms: (1) current and future losses of net income directly
indirectly associated with diversions and consumptive uses that
are curtailed because of a water transfer; (2) current and future
losses of instream values; (3) losses of incomes in activities
linked to those diversions and instream values; and (4) losses
which accrue to "society at large" in the area of origin.
Regarding (1), three classes of potentially affected
activities stand out: (a) currently operating direct diverters
and consumers of water; (b) users of the return flows from the
initial diverters; and (c) future water-using activities that
currently do not exist. Currently operating activities that
are curtailed by a transfer are observable and their losses of
net income can be determined. Return flows from these existing
activities can be estimated and associated income losses can also
be estimated.
Future uses of water must be forecasted, using some type of
forecasting procedures or models. Many states have detailed
state economic models, like Colorado's Forecasting and Simulation
Model. Such models permit forecasting on a county or planning
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region basis, relating these forecasts to credible national
forecasts (such as the Wharton School Forecasts or those of Data
Resources, Inc.). Such models work reasonably well in fore
casting future levels of existing activities, but they cannot
invent activities not already on the scene.
Reservation of water for in-basin future uses is somewhat at
odds with prior appropriation doctrine which emphasizes present
beneficial use of water. However, several western states now
allow state agencies to reserve water for future purposes.
Colorado law recognizes "conditional" water rights which an
applicant may obtain now for intended future use. 108 ip0 maintain
such rights, "due diligence" toward applying that water to a
beneficial use must be demonstrated to the water court every
four years by exhibiting studies, investments, or other concrete
actions to show that progress towards use of the water is being
made. There has been a shift toward stricter interpretation of
due diligence in recent years. On the Colorado River Basin, most
conditional rights have been established by prospective ex
porters, especially cities. Perhaps a more common way of
reserving water for future use is to acquire existing water
rights and leave that water in its current use until needed for
new activities.109 Though uncertain, future water uses must be
108por a recent discussion, see Hallford, Developments in
Conditional Water Rights Law, 14 The Colorado Lawyer 353 (1985).
109por a discussion of the inefficiencies of this system see
Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste
in Water Resource Development," 23 Nat. Res. J. 7 (1983).
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considered.
The analysis of instream uses (2. above) is much the same,
in that there may be direct curtailment of current instream
values and further future losses of instream values. There is
likely to be immediate loss of some instream values, even in
cases involving no immediate loss of income to water diverters.
For example, on smaller streams, transfers may make it more
difficult for towns and industries to meet ambient water quality
standards, forcing them to undertake higher levels of waste
treatment.
Regarding (3), there are likely to be at least temporary
losses of income in activities linked to the major water-using
sectors. If a direct water using activity such as irrigated
agriculture is curtailed, certain "backward linked" industries
like farm equipment and chemical suppliers and certain "forward
linked" industries like livestock, food processing, and meat
packing industries will find the demand for their services
reduced with consequent reductions in their net incomes. Some of
the human and other resources consequently left unemployed will
find new employment, but for those left unemployed over various
time intervals, the income losses are attributable to the
transfer. These income losses can be estimated but are subject
to substantial uncertainty.
Finally, some losses (4. above) may indirectly occur "to
society at large" in the basin of origin through under-utiliza-
tion of public facilities, decline in the tax base, reduction in
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quality of public services, and possibly as a result of selective
migration that leaves a less capable population behind.
Direct diverters and users of return flows are afforded
protection from damage under the existing appropriation doc
trine. Water can be taken from current uses only through
purchase or condemnation. In either case, appropriate prices
(compensation) would be paid to the direct water users. Junior
appropriators can seek protection against any injury during the
court or permit proceedings. Thus, only four classes of damaged
parties potentially warrant compensation beyond that presently
assured under the prior appropriation doctrine:
(1) parties indirectly suffering employment and income
losses from curtailment of direct and instream uses;
(2) all unprotected current and future instream uses;
(3) future direct uses not currently in place; and
(4) the "public at large" in the area of origin who experi
ence lower quality public services.
Since many of these values lie in the future, we must equate
them to present values for purposes of determining appropriate
compensation. The procedure for accomplishing this equivalence
is known as "discounting. "
ll^A dollar now is worth more than a dollar later because
today's money can be invested at some interest rate. If r is the
rate of interest, the future value FV(t) t years hence of N
dollars received today would be:
(1) FV(t) = (1 + r)t n
In this sense, N represents the "present value" (PV) of FV(t) to
be received t years from now, or dividing by (1 + r)fc,
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C. Appropriate Forms of Compensation
Thus far, it has been argued that the amount of compensation
to be paid by the parties transferring water out-of-basin
should be the present value of all current and future losses
imposed on unprotected parties, i.e. those not automatically
compensated by sale of water rights nor protected from injury by
the courts. What of the form that compensation should take?
Generally speaking, the most useful form of compensation would be
an unrestricted monetary grant of the appropriate present value,
placed in escrow at interest, and to be used by the basin of
origin to compensate unprotected parties and for whatever other
purposes its citizenry prefers.
Compensation should definitely not be aimed at keeping water
prices or costs of water development to in-basin users from
rising as water becomes scarcer. Water prices should reflect the
real scarcity value of water. As water is transferred outside a
basin because of its greater value there, water does become
scarcer in the basin than it otherwise would have been. The cost
If there exists a sequence of future values, FV(1), FV(2), ...,
FV(t), each to be received in the corresponding future years, a
present value can be computed for the entire sequence by adding
the individual annual present values:
pv - FV(1) + F n mii „
FV " (1 + r) (1 + r)2 (1 + r)t
The selection of an appropriate interest rate (or a discount
rate) r is somewhat controversial, but for public sector purposes
(and assuming no inflation) a rate in the five to ten percent
range is generally chosen in practice.
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of water to users should then reflect the fact of this scarcity
and not the scarcity of some by-gone era. The effect of pro
visions like those in the Colorado Water Conservancy District Act
quoted earlier, that "present.•.and...prospective appropriations
of water...will not be impaired nor increased in cost" is to
distort the real scarcity signals to in-basin water users and to
induce them to apply water to uses and in quantities that are not
justifiable in light of current scarcities.
It is not clear that compensatory storage will always be the
form of compensation most useful to the area of origin. Perhaps
schools, highways, or hospitals would be of greater benefit,
given the hydrologic situation and other needs. Even when
storage i_s determined to be the most useful form of compensation,
there is the issue of timing of construction of that storage.
Clearly, it should be sized and timed in accordance with the
needs of the area of origin. One official, mistaking ineffi
ciency for foresight, recently stated, "We built Green Mountain
Reservoir 45 years ago, and now we need it." This is not good
economic logic, but the project was acceptable to both sides
largely because the federal government paid most of the cost.
These observations also have some implications for the
appropriate institutions to negotiate for and manage the re
sources gained from compensation. If negotiations over losses
are to represent all of the unprotected losing parties identified
above and if the uses of these compensatory resources are to be
determined in the interest of all losing parties and not just
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water users, then a governmental unit of general jurisdiction
should control negotiations and manage the use of the resultant
compensatory resources.
D. General Economic Guidelines for Compensation
1. Compensation paid should equal the present value of net
incomes and public amenities lost in the area of origin, less
the price paid (if any) for the water rights involved in the
transfer. The relevant categories of lost income and amenities
are:
(a) future net income that would be generated directly
and indirectly in the basin by future diversion uses of
currently unused waters;
(b) current and future values and incomes directly and
indirectly associated with instream uses; and
(c) losses to the general public from deterioration of
public services and quality of life.
2. Compensation should not be restricted to construction of
water storage nor to funding restricted to that final use.
Payment should be made to agencies not faced with this constraint
if possible, i.e. to units of general government.
3. Compensation should not aim at keeping the price of
water to the user below its real scarcity value in the state.
4. If water storage is the most efficient form of compensa
tion from the area of origin's viewpoint, construction of the
storage facilities should be delayed until they are actually
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needed. The needed money payment would be the present value of
the planning, filing, land acquisition, and construction costs.
5. The amount of compensation that should be paid to losing
parties should be based on the assumption that those parties will
act rationally to adapt to the new water supply situation,
i.e. that they will undertake all cost-effective steps to
minimize their income losses in the face of diminished water.
6. These principles should be applied to all out-of-basin
transfers, not only to those executed by conservancy districts.
VII. CONCLUSION
The fundamental principle of the appropriation doctrine
favoring the beneficial use of water irrespective of location is
still sound. In an arid climate, water must be free to move to
the point of demand when warranted by the social and economic
conditions. Artificial restrictions hindering this movement
should be minimized. At the same time, the area of origin has
legitimate interests that should be acknowledged in such diver
sions.
As a general principle, transbasin diversions should not
occur unless they represent the least-cost source of water for
the importing region. In addition, such diversions should not be
undertaken unless the total benefits in the importing region
exceed the costs to the exporting region plus the cost of the
transfer facilities. Costs to the exporting area are represented
by the present value of incomes lost.
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Application of the foregoing economic guidelines to various
types of areas of origin protection clearly indicates the
superiority of some approaches over others: prohibition,
recapture, assignment of permanent priorities, and direct
reservation of water bear no relationship to the actual costs to
the area-of-origin nor to the benefits in the area of use. Those
states with administrative control of water appropriations such
as Nebraska and Kansas^^- may be able to incorporate these
principles into their review process. The Colorado approach,
though compensatory in nature, has a number of important short
comings.
Unnecessary restrictions on such transfers can be avoided by
allowing compensation to be considered. Compensation provides a
means to offset lost opportunity costs in the basin of origin
while assuring that the transferring entity has made its choice
with full recognition of the costs involved. In this way the
objectives of equity as well as economic efficiency may be
enhanced.
Some difficult legal and policy issues remain in implement
ing these principles. For example, the appropriate area of
origin must be determined. Considerations here include the need
for clarity in definition,112 the desirability of utilizing
text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
112Terms such as "basin," watershed," "stream system," and
"drainage" are imprecise and have different meanings to different
people. As has been pointed out, "[t]he physical limits of a
basin or watershed are not always well-defined, nor does the
entity necessarily serve as a practical unit for administering
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governmental boundaries rather than purely hydrologic
boundaries,113 and the extent of the watershed area to be
included.114
A second important area concerns the matter of compen
sation. Many of the potentially adverse effects of a water
transfer are already addressed. For example, senior water rights
are protected in all respects under the prior appropriation
system. Even junior water rights, if they exist, are entitled to
protection assuring maintenance of stream conditions as they
existed at the time their rights were established.115 Mitigation
of adverse environmental effects is likely to be addressed as a
result of existing environmental protection requirements.
However, some potential costs associated with transbasin
water rights." Westphal and Lawler, "Commitments, Priorities,
and Organizational Options for Water Resources Planning in
Oklahoma," Oklahoma Water Resources Research Institute (August
1979) at 91. A major issue in the case of The Oklahoma Water
Resource Board v. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd., supra note
30, turns on whether a diversion of water from a drainage by a
city primarily located in an adjacent drainage but also partly
located in the original drainage constitutes out-of-basin use
under Oklahoma law. Such issues suggest the need for clarity in
defining the area of origin.
113For example, a county could theoretically encompass more
than one basin of origin.
114Conceivably, all transfers could be subjected to review
based on these principles. Kansas takes the approach of review
ing only those transfers greater than 10 miles from the point of
diversion. See note 39 supra. Alternatively, transfers in which
the water never returns to the same stream system anywhere within
the state could be the subject of review. Individual character
istics and concerns of each state would affect this choice.
115See, e.g., Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City
of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954).
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diversions are more difficult to address. There is no ready way
to evaluate the degree to which transbasin diversion of water
will affect future growth and development in the basin of
origin. Such an assessment necessarily must be based on a large
number of assumptions regarding highly speculative future
events. The multiple difficulties in such an undertaking suggest
the need to look for viable alternatives. One such alternative
may be a transfer fee analogous to a mineral severance tax.
Funds collected as a result of such a fee could be made available
to appropriate units within the basin of origin for investments
that would benefit the area.^-^
Compensation, if properly designed, may avoid the need to
unnecessarily restrict transbasin diversions. Coupled with
appropriate mitigation, a compensation mechanism can address the
concerns of areas of origin while at the same time permitting the
movement of scarce water resources to the point of greatest
need. This ability to respond to the broad needs of an effective
system of water allocation makes compensation an attractive
approach.
would also be available to compensate specific
costs not addressed for whatever reason during the initial
transfer process. For example, some costs might not be apparent
at the time of this initial process. Such costs could be
compensated out of such a fund.
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